Abstract-This paper investigates secrecy rate optimization for a multicasting network, in which a transmitter broadcasts the same information to multiple legitimate users in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. In order to improve the achievable secrecy rates, private jammers are employed to generate inter ference to confuse the eavesdroppers. These private jammers charge the legitimate transmitter for their jamming services based on the amount of interference received at the eavesdroppers.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of information theoretic security was first investigated in [1] for wiretap channels by defining the concept of the secrecy capacity. Since then, information theoretic security has received considerable attention due to its low complexity implementation and suitability for the dynamic configurations of wireless networks, in which the physical layer characteristics of wireless channels are exploited to establish secure communication between legitimate terminals. This novel paradigm complements the conventional crypto graphic methods implemented in the upper networking layers by providing additional security at the physical layer.
Multi-antenna terminals have the potential to enhance the performance of secret communications by exploiting spatial degrees of freedom. However, the secrecy rates that are achievable by using multi-antenna terminals are still limited by the quality of the wireless channels between the legitimate transmitter and the receivers, including the legitimate receivers and the eavesdroppers [2] - [7] . The existing works in [3] , [S] and [9] demonstrate that the performance of secret communi cations can be further improved by using cooperative jarmning and artificial noise techniques, in which jamming signals are transmitted from external jammers or integrated with the information bearing signals sent by the legitimate translnitter. These approaches effectively degrade the capability of the eavesdroppers for retrieving the legitimate users' signals, and hence enhance the achievable secrecy rates. Recently, game theoretic approaches have been applied to resource allocation problems in wireless secret conununication networks [lO] - [IS] . In [10] , a zero-sum game was formulated for a secret communication network by considering the signal to-interference-plus-noise rate (SINR) difference between the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper as the utility function. The interaction among the nodes in cognitive radio networks has been investigated by using a Stackelberg game [11] . Cooperative game theory has been used to improve the secrecy capacity of ad-hoc networks in [13] , and a distributed tree formation game was proposed for multihop wireless networks in [12] . Physical layer security has been investigated through a Stackelberg game for a two-way relaying network with unfriendly jarmners in [14] , and a distributed auction based approach has been used to enhance the secrecy capacity in [15] . Jamming games have been formulated for multiple input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channels with an active eavesdropper in [16] , and a secrecy game for a Gaussian multiple-input single-output (MISO) interference channel has been investigated in [17] .
In this paper, a multicating network is considered as shown in Fig. 1 , in which all the legitimate users are to receive the same information in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. In order to improve the achievable secrecy rates of the legitimate users, the private jammers are employed to generate artificial noise and confuse the eavesdroppers. These private januners introduce costs for their jamming services based on the amount of interference generated to the eavesdroppers. To compensate for these jamming costs, the legitimate users pay the trans mitter for their enhanced secret communications. Based on these interactions between the legitimate transceivers and the private jarmners, we formulate the secrecy rate maximization problem as a Stackelberg game. A fixed interference price scenario is considered first and then a closed-form solution for the optimal amount of interference generated to each eavesdropper is obtained. Based on this solution, we then investigate the corresponding Stackelberg equilibrium for the formulated game. In addition, simulation results are provided to validate the theoretical derivations of the proposed game theoretic approach.
II. S YSTEM MODEL
A secret communication network with K legitimate users, L eavesdroppers and L private januners is considered in this paper, as shown in Fig.l , where the transmitter broadcasts a common message to be received by all the legitimate users in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. In this secure network, the transmitter is equipped with NT transmit antennas, whereas 
lli�L[J Jammer L respectively. In addition, a set of private (friendly) jammers are em ployed to provide jamming services as shown in Fig.l . These private jammers generate artificial interference to confuse the eavesdroppers and they ensure that there is no interfer ence leakage to the legitimate users. This is achieved by appropriately designing the beamformers at the jammers and employing a dedicated jammer near each eavesdropper. Since, a dedicated jammer is closely located with the corresponding eavesdropper, each eavesdropper receives strong co-channel interference from its corresponding private jammer.
Note that these private jammers charge the legitimate transceivers for their dedicated jamming services based on the amount of interference generated to each eavesdropper. To compensate for these interference costs, the legitimate transmitter introduces charges to the legitimate users for their enhanced secure communications, by using the achievable secrecy rates as the criteria. The channel gain between the [th eavesdropper and the corresponding jammer is denoted by Igjll 2 . Furthermore, it is assumed that the legitimate transmitter and the jammers have perfect channel state information of the eavesdroppers. This assumption is appropriate in a multicasting network, where potential eavesdroppers are also legitimate users of the network. This assumption has been commonly used in the literature [19] - [21] . The achievable secrecy rate at the kth user can be written as follows: [22] � � w H h k hf[ W ) III. GAME THEORETIC ApPROACH FOR SECRECY RATE
OPTIMIZATION
In this section, we formulate the secrecy rate maximization problem as a Stackelberg game and then investigate the Stack elberg equilibrium for the proposed game. This game consists of two sets of players: a) leaders and b) follower. All these players try to maximize their revenues, where the leaders first make a move and the followers will choose their strategies according to the leaders' decisions. In the multicasting net work considered in this paper, the private jatmners (leaders) announce their interference prices and then the legitimate transmitter (follower) determines the interference requirements according to the interference prices.
The interference received at the [th eavesdropper from the corresponding private jatmner can be written as follows: 11 = P11gj11 2 .
(2)
Here, we are only interested in the transmit power used by the jammer, where the beamformer at the jammer is appropriately designed to ensure that there is no interference leakage to the legitimate users. The private jammers aim to maximize their revenues by selling interference to the transmitter. The revenue of the [th private jammer can be written as follows:
where fJl is the unit interference price charged by the cor responding jammer to cause interference at the [th eaves dropper. Depending on the interference requirement at the [th eavesdropper, the interference price should be determined by the corresponding jammer to maximize its revenue. These interference prices can be determined by solving the following optimization problem: 
(4)
On the other hand, the transmitter aims to maximize its revenue by charging the legitimate users based on their achievable secrecy rates, where the revenue function at the transmitter can be written as follows:
where Ak and Rk are the unit price for the secrecy rate and the achievable secrecy rate at the kth user, respectively. It is assumed that the unit price for each user is fixed at a predetermined value. Hence, the transmitter should determine the beamforming vector as well as the interference require ments at different eavesdroppers in order to maximize its revenue. We first focus on the interference requirements at each eavesdropper with a fixed beamformer at the transmitter, which can be formulated into an optimization problem as follows:
where p = [P l ··· PLJ represents the power allocation coef ficients at all jammers. Problem (A) and Problem (B) form a Stackelberg game, and it is important to investigate the corresponding Stackelberg equilibrium.
A. Stackelberg Equilibrium
The Stackelberg equilibrium for the proposed game is defined as follows:
Stackelberg equilibrium: Let p * be the optimal solution for Problem ( B) whereas /1 * contains the best prices for Problem (A). The solutions p * and /1 * define a Stackelberg equilibrium point if the following conditions are satisfied for any set of P and J-L:
IV. STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTION
In this section, we derive a Stackelberg equilibrium solution for the proposed game. In order to analyze this equilibrium, the best response of the transmitter is first derived in terms of the interference requirement at each eavesdropper for fixed interference prices. Then, the optimal interference prices for the private jammers are obtained to maximize their revenues. These best responses can be derived by solving Problem (A) and Problem (B). Particularly, we first solve the problem for a scenario with fixed interference prices. Based on this solution, we then derive a Stackelberg equilibrium for the proposed game. Note that we only consider the secure communication network with a single legitimate user and multiple eavesdrop pers. However, this can be easily extended for a scenario with multiple legitimate users and multiple eavesdroppers.
A. Fixed Interference Prices
In this subsection, we focus on the fixed interference price scenario with a single legitimate user and multiple eavesdrop pers. Note that for a particular user, eavesdroppers with large achievable rates are more damaging since they significantly reduce the secrecy rate of this legitimate user. Therefore, introducing jamming to these eavesdroppers will effectively improve the achievable secrecy rate of the legitimate user. Therefore, a set of eavesdroppers that have strong connections to the source are defined as super-active eavesdroppers. The rest of the eavesdroppers are referred as non-super-active eavesdroppers. The achievable secrecy rate of the legitimate user is defined as follows:
where
The optimal interference requirements at each eavesdropper can be formulated as follows:
where the vector P = [PI ... P K] includes the power allocation coefficients of the private jammers in the set JK consisting of all super-active eavesdroppers. Without loss of generality, this problem can be reformulated as follows:
This problem is convex with respect to the power allocation coefficients at the private jammers and can be efficiently solved through interior point methods [23] .
Proposition 1: By using the optimal solution of (10), the achievable rates of the super-active eavesdroppers (i.e., t i , i E JK) will be equal and the power allocation coefficients of the non-super-active eavesdroppers (i.e., i 'I. JK) will be all zeros.
Proof: Assume that t i , i E JK are not equal, and that the minimum t i = tm i n < to from all t i , i = 1,··· , K, and the corresponding Pi will be higher than that of tm i n = to · Hence, the revenue of the transmitter (cost function of (10» with t i = tm i n will be less than that with t i = to. Thus, the achievable rates of the super-active eavesdroppers (i.e., t i , i E JK) will be equal when the optimal solution is used and the power allocation coefficients for the non-super-active eavesdroppers (i.e., i 'I. JK) will be zero .• Hence, the optimal interference requirements can be obtained by solving the convex problem in (10).
B. Stackelberg Game
In this subsection, we formulate the problem as a Stack elberg game and investigate a Stackelberg equilibrium for the proposed game. In order to derive this equilibrium of the game, the best responses of both the leaders and the follower should be obtained. The best response of the legitimate transmitter can be obtained by solving the following problem:
where the vector P = [PI··· PK] consists of the power allocation coefficients of the private jammers in the super active eavesdropper set K As we discussed in the previous subsection in (10), this problem is convex and the optimal power allocation can be obtained. Furthermore, the closed form solution of this power allocation problem should be determined by deriving a Stackelberg equilibrium of the proposed game, as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: The optimal power allocation coefficient at the ith jammer is given by where (3i
Proof Please refer to Appendix A.
• The private jarmners need to announce their interference prices to maximize their revenues. These optimal interference prices can be obtained by solving the following problem:
Based on the closed-form solution of the optimal power allocation coefficients p is in (12) in terms of the interference prices J1i S, the optimal interference prices problem can be point if the following conditions are satisfied for any set of p and JL:
IV. STACKELB ERG EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTION
In this section, we derive a Stackelberg equilibrium solution for the proposed game. In order to analyze this equilibrium, the best response of the transmitter is first derived in terms of the interference requirement at each eavesdropper for fixed interference prices. Then, the optimal interference prices for the private jammers are obtained to maximize their revenues. These best responses can be derived by solving Problem (A) and Problem (B). Particularly, we first solve the problem for a scenario with fixed interference prices. Based on this solution, we then derive a Stackelberg equilibrium for the proposed game. Note that we only consider the secure communication network with a single legitimate user and multiple eavesdroppers. However, this can be easily extended for a scenario with multiple legitimate users and multiple eavesdroppers.
A. Fixed Interference Prices
In this subsection, we focus on the fixed interference price scenario with a single legitimate user and multiple eavesdroppers. Note that for a particular user, eavesdroppers with large achievable rates are more damaging since they significantly reduce the secrecy rate of this legitimate user. Therefore, introducing januning to these eavesdroppers will effectively improve the achievable secrecy rate of the legitimate user. Therefore, a set of eavesdroppers that have strong connections to the source are defined as super-active eavesdroppers. The rest of the eavesdroppers are referred as non-super-active eavesdroppers. The achievable secrecy rate of the legitimate user is defined as follows: 
where the vector p = [PI' .. PK ] includes the power allocation coefficients of the private januners in the set JK consisting of all super-active eavesdroppers. Without loss of generality, this problem can be reformulated as follows:
This problem is convex with respect to the power allocation coefficients at the private jmmners and can be efficiently solved through interior point methods [23] .
Proposition 1: By using the optimal solution of (10), the achievable rates of the super-active eavesdroppers (i.e. , t i , i E JK) will be equal and the power allocation coefficients of the non-super-active eavesdroppers (i.e., i ' I. JK) will be all zeros.
Proof: Assume that ti, i E JK are not equal, and that the minimum t i = tmin < to from all t i , i = 1"" ,K, and the corresponding Pi will be higher than that of tmin = to· Hence, the revenue of the transmitter (cost function of (10» with t i = tmin will be less than that with t i = to. Thus, the achievable rates of the super-active eavesdroppers (i.e., ti, i E JK) will be equal when the optimal solution is used and the power allocation coefficients for the non-super-active eavesdroppers (i.e., i ' I. JK) will be zero .
• Hence, the optimal interference requirements can be obtained by solving the convex problem in (10).
B. Stackelberg Game
In this subsection, we formulate the problem as a Stackelberg game and investigate a Stackelberg equilibrium for the proposed game. In order to derive this equilibrium of the game, the best responses of both the leaders and the follower should be obtained. The best response of the legitimate transmitter can be obtained by solving the following problem:
where the vector p = [PI'" PK ] consists of the power allocation coefficients of the private jammers in the superactive eavesdropper set K As we discussed in the previous subsection in (10), this problem is convex and the optimal power allocation can be obtained. Furthermore, the closedform solution of this power allocation problem should be determined by deriving a Stackelberg equilibrium of the proposed game, as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: The optimal power allocation coefficient at the ith jammer is given by
where f3i wHgi gfw
• The private jammers need to announce their interference prices to maximize their revenues. These optimal interference prices can be obtained by solving the following problem:
Based on the closed-form solution of the optimal power allocation coefficients pi s in (12) in terms of the interference prices J1 i S, the optimal interference prices problem can be refonnulated as
The optimal interference prices fJ i S can be obtained by solving the above problem through existing numerical methods. How ever, the closed-form solutions of these interference prices are not easy to derive. Therefore, we assume the use of the same interference price (uniform interference price) for all private jammers (i.e., fJl = fJ2 = ... = fJK = fJo). The problem in (15) can be formulated with the unifonn interference price as follows:
2)\l {J,0 L:
Lemma 2: The optimal interference price fJo in (16) is given
where 1')1= (1+�:
2 ) , 1') 2 = (C 2 +K(J 2 ), C 2 =f.(3 i . (18) i =l
Proof Please refer to Appendix B.
• Hence, the Stackelberg equilibrium of the proposed game with uniform interference price can be defined by (Pi V i, fJo), at which both the transmitter and the private jammers maximize their revenues.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we validate the derived theoretical results by using computer simulations. Here, we consider a multicasting network with a single legitimate user and two eavesdroppers, where the transmitter broadcasts the same information to all the legitimate users in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. In addition, private jammers are employed to confuse the eavesdroppers by introducing interference, which will im prove the achievable secrecy rates of the legitimate users. It is assumed that the legitimate transmitter is equipped with three antennas whereas each of the legitimate user and the eavesdroppers has a single antenna. The channel coefficients between all the terminals are generated through zero-mean circularly symmetric independent and identically distributed complex Gaussian random variables and the noise variance at all the terminals is assumed to be 0.1. In the following subsections, we provide simulation results for the scenario with fixed interference prices and the Stackelberg game scenario, respectively.
A. Fixed Inteiference Prices
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance of the proposed schemes with fixed interference prices at the private jammers. The fixed unit interference prices at the jammers are assumed to be 1 and 3 (i.e., fJl = 1, fJ2 = 3), respectively.
Ta ble 1 provides the theoretical and simulation based optimal power allocation coefficients and the corresponding revenues of the legitimate transmitter for different sets of channels. These results validate the derivation of the theoretical results which are indistinguishable from the simulation based results.
B. Stackelberg Game
In this subsection, we validate the derived Stackelberg equilibrium of the proposed game. Table 2 provides the derived theoretical Stackelberg equilibrium and the simulation based one, as well as the corresponding jammer revenues with the unifonn interference price assumption (i.e., fJl = fJ2 = fJo) for different sets of channels. The simulation results are consistent with the theoretical ones and validate the Stackelberg equilib rium of the proposed game for different sets of channels. It is worth pointing out that any deviations from these equilibria caused by different strategies of the legitimate transmitter and the jammers will introduce losses in their revenues.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the secrecy rate optimization problem for a multicasting network, in which multiple users are to receive the same information in the presence of multi ple eavesdroppers. To improve the secrecy rate performance, private jammers are employed to generate interference to the eavesdroppers. In addition, these jammers charge the legitimate transceivers for their jamming services. This optimization problem has been formulated as a Stackelberg game, in which the private jammers and the legitimate transmitter are the play ers of the game. We have first focused on the fixed interference price scenario and a closed-form solution was derived for the optimal interference requirements. Based on this solution, a Stackelberg equilibrium was derived to maximize the revenues of both the legitimate transmitter and the private jammers. Simulation results have been provided to support the derived theoretical results. With the optimal power allocation coefficients in (10), the achievable rates of the super-active eavesdroppers (i.e., i E JK) will be equal as stated in Proposition 1. Hence, the power allocation coefficient at the ith private jammer can be written as follows:
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The original optimization problem in (10) can be formulated in tenns of 1' 0 as follows:
The optimal 1'0 should satisfy the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions and therefore we obtain the following: 8Jbo) Al 
The optimal interference prices fJ i S can be obtained by solving the above problem through existing numerical methods. However, the closed-form solutions of these interference prices are not easy to derive. Therefore, we assume the use of the same interference price (uniform interference price) for all private jammers (i .e. , fJI = fJ2 = ... = fJK = fJo)· The problem in (15) can be formulated with the uniform interference price as follows:
Lemma 2: The optimal interference price fJo in (16) is given by
• Hence, the Stackelberg equilibrium of the proposed game with uniform interference price can be defined by (Pi I;j i , fJo), at which both the transmitter and the private jammers maximize their revenues.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we validate the derived theoretical results by using computer simulations. Here, we consider a multicasting network with a single legitimate user and two eavesdroppers, where the transmitter broadcasts the same information to all the legitimate users in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. In addition, private jammers are employed to confuse the eavesdroppers by introducing interference, which will improve the achievable secrecy rates of the legitimate users. It is assumed that the legitimate transmitter is equipped with three antennas whereas each of the legitimate user and the eavesdroppers has a single antenna. The channel coefficients between all the terminals are generated through zero-mean circularly synunetric independent and identically distributed complex Gaussian random variables and the noise variance at all the terminals is assumed to be 0.1. In the following subsections, we provide simulation results for the scenario with fixed interference prices and the Stackelberg game scenario, respectively.
A. Fixed Interference Prices
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance of the proposed schemes with fixed interference prices at the private januners. The fixed unit interference prices at the jammers are assumed to be 1 and 3 (i.e. , fJI = 1, fJ2 = 3), respectively. Table 1 provides the theoretical and simulation based optimal power allocation coefficients and the corresponding revenues of the legitimate transmitter for different sets of channels. These results validate the derivation of the theoretical results which are indistinguishable from the simulation based results.
B. Stackelberg Game
In this subsection, we validate the derived Stackelberg equilibrium of the proposed game. Table 2 provides the derived theoretical Stackelberg equilibrium and the simulation based one, as well as the corresponding jammer revenues with the uniform interference price assumption (i.e., fJI = fJ2 = fJo) for different sets of channels. The simulation results are consistent with the theoretical ones and validate the Stackelberg equilibrium of the proposed game for different sets of channels. It is worth pointing out that any deviations from these equilibria caused by different strategies of the legitimate transmitter and the jatmners will introduce losses in their revenues.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the secrecy rate optimization problem for a multicasting network, in which multiple users are to receive the same information in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. To improve the secrecy rate performance, private jammers are employed to generate interference to the eavesdroppers. In addition, these jatmners charge the legitimate transceivers for their jamming services. This optimization problem has been formulated as a Stackelberg game, in which the private jatmners and the legitimate transmitter are the players of the game. We have first focused on the fixed interference price scenario and a closed-form solution was derived for the optimal interference requirements. Based on this solution, a Stackelberg equilibrium was derived to maximize the revenues of both the legitimate transmitter and the private jammers. Simulation results have been provided to support the derived theoretical results.
ApPENDIX A: PROOF OF LEMMA 1
With the optimal power allocation coefficients in (10) , the achievable rates of the super-active eavesdroppers (i.e., i E JK) will be equal as stated in Proposition 1. Hence, the power allocation coefficient at the ith private jatmner can be written as follows: The original optimization problem in (10) can be formulated in terms of ,0 as follows: (23) The optimal ' 0 should satisfy the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions and therefore we obtain the following: (1 + , 0)2 -AI · By substituting q Hence, the optimal 10 can be obtained if Al is large enough to satisfy the above condition. This means that the legitimate transmitter should charge the legitimate user a reasonable price to make a profit. Note that the optimal 1 0 should satisfy the KKT conditions
The optimal 10 can be obtained by solving the following equation:
and 10 > 0 ,
Hence the optimal power allocation coefficient of the ith can be written as follows:
This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
• ApPENDIX B: PROOF OF LEMMA 2
We first show that the revenue function of the jammers in (16) is concave in J-lo for P i > ( 0 ) in (12), and then we derive the optimal interference price J-lo . The revenue function of the jammers is defined as follows:
where (; 1 = L�l (3 i. The concavity of !(J-lo) can be proven by finding the second derivative with respect to J-lo as in (19) . In order to prove that the function in (30) is concave, we need to show that the second derivative (i.e., has been proved in (20) and (21) which are in the previous page. This confirms that the revenue function of the jammers is concave in J-lo and the optimal J-lo should satisfy the KKT O/-Lo q3 (Cl/-LO + q) 3 (21) Hence, the optimal /,o can be obtained if Al is large enough to satisfy the above condition. This means that the legitimate transmitter should charge the legitimate user a reasonable price to make a profit. Note that the optimal /,o should satisfy the KKT conditions ofCYo) = 0.
of(/-Lo) O/-LO
The optimal /,o can be obtained by solving the following equation: 
We first show that the revenue function of the jammers in (19) . In order to prove that the function in (30) is concave, we need to show that the second derivative (i.e., 821(~0» ) is negative. This uI"o has been proved in (20) and (21) This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
